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CAPITAL GAINS, DIVIDENDS, AND TAXES:
MARKET REACTIONS TO TAX CHANGES
Mark Foster, Arkansas State University
Larry White, Mississippi State University
Michael T. Young, Minnesota State University – Mankato
ABSTRACT
The purpose of this study is to examine the effect of a capital gains tax reduction on the stock
price of firms that have not historically paid a dividend.   If markets are semi-strong-form efficient,
one would expect that the market price would have already adjusted prior to the day the
announcement was made, assuming no new information was included in the announcement.  If
markets have not already incorporated the information, there would be a possibility for abnormal
returns from investing in the stocks on the date of the announcement.  This paper studies the returns
from companies prior to, and subsequent to, the capital gains tax reduction announcement date and
compares the price changes of non-dividend paying companies to those of similar firms that have
historically paid dividends.   The a priori expectation of the study is that the majority of a change
in prices will take place prior to the announcement date as investors anticipate the likelihood of
passage by the Congress and the President.  
INTRODUCTION
From the time firms first began paying their stockholders dividends, an argument has raged
between those who believe dividends add to stock value and those who believe dividends detract
from stock value.  Miller & Modigliani (1961) only add another school of thought by proposing that
dividends are irrelevant in a world without taxes.  The United States, however, is not a world
without taxes and previous research finds a significant positive impact on the price of tax-favored
assets from an increase in beneficial tax treatments (Scholes & Wolfson, 1992).  The focus of this
paper is on the effects of the 1997 reduction of the capital gains tax on the price of stocks that have
not historically paid dividends to their shareholders.  The study incorporates the use of parametric
tests to determine the relative impact of the tax reduction on stocks that do not pay dividends
compared to those that do pay dividends.  This capital gains tax change was unique in that it: 1)
occurred during a period of a relatively bullish market, 2) was not coupled with a change in the
ordinary tax rate, and 3) occurred during an otherwise uneventful week in the stock market.  These
factors aid in distinguishing the unique impact of the tax change on the valuation of common stock.
Other studies focus on capital gain tax reductions that are accompanied by changes in the ordinary
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tax rate and/or market anomalies such as the Crash of ‘87, which make it much more difficult to
gauge the impact of the capital gains tax change.
First, it may be helpful to briefly explain the capital gains tax on equity investments and its
implications for the stock market.  Capital gains are defined as the increase in an asset’s value over
its purchase price.  When the asset is sold, the resulting gains are said to be realized and now subject
to taxation at the capital gains tax rate.  Until the asset is sold, the gains are referred to as unrealized
and are not subject to taxation.  Corporate stocks account for 78% of the total amount of capital
gains on all assets with the next closest category being bonds.  
When Congress first established the income tax system in 1913, capital gains were taxed as
ordinary income.  From 1913 until the beginning of the 1980's, the capital gains tax has, at times,
been a favorite way of generating revenue and generating votes, as evidenced by the political timing
of changes in the tax laws. Prior to 1986, capital gains and dividend payment were taxed differently
with 60% of long-term capital gains exempt from taxation.  Such incentives made stocks offering
higher capital gains, as opposed to higher dividends, more attractive to investors.  In 1986, Congress
passed the 1986 Tax Reform Act which changed the way capital gains were taxed.  It essentially
brought the taxation of dividends and capital gains to the same level.  The act made all capital gains
taxable at the same rates as other income.  This removed the essence of the preference bias for
capital gains as opposed to dividend income.  It has been argued that part of the motivation behind
this increase in the capital gains tax rate was an attempt to reduce the level of investment in risky
assets, i.e., stocks that rewarded investors with capital gains rather than dividends.  The entire
history of capital gains tax rates is included in Exhibit 1.
Exhibit 1:  Summary of Tax Treatment of Long-Term Capital Gains 1913 - 2010
Years Maximum tax
rate on capital
gains(%) 
1/ Maximum tax rate on
ordinary income (%)
1/
Exclusion percentage for
long-term capital gains
(%)
Holding period
required for long-term
gain or loss
1913-15 7 7 None n/a
1916 15 15 None n/a
1917 67 67 None n/a
1918 77 77 None n/a
1919-21 73 73 None n/a
1922-33 12.5 24-63 None 2/ 2 years
1934-35 18.9 63 20,40,60,70 3/ 1,2,3,5,10 years
1936-37 23.7 79 20,40,60,70 3/ 1,2,3,5,10 years
1938-41 15 79-81.1 33,50 3/ 18 mo.,2 yr.
1942-51 25 82-94 50 6 mo.
1952-53 26 92 50 6 mo.
1954-63 25 91 50 6 mo.
1964-67 25 70-77 50 6 mo.
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1968 26.9 75.3 50 6 mo.
1969 27.5 77 50 6 mo.
1970 32.21 71.8 50 6 mo.
1971 34.25 70 50 6 mo.
1972-75 45.5 4/ 70 50 6 mo.
1976-78 49.125 4/ 70 50 6 mo.,9 mo., 1  yr.
1979-80 28 70 60 1 yr.
1981 28/20 5/ 69.125 60 1 yr.
1982-86 20 50 60 6 mo., 1 yr.
1987 28 38.5 None 1 yr.
1988-90 28 (33 in
Bubble)
28 (33 in Bubble) None 1 yr.
1991-92 28.93 (28) 6/ 31.93 (31) None 1 yr.
1993-96 29.188 (28) 6/ 40.788 (39.6) None 1 yr.
1997 21.188 (20) 7/ 40.788 (39.6) None 12,18 months 8/
1998-00 21.188 (20) 7/ 40.788 (39.6) None 1 yr.
2001 21.173 (20) 7/ 40.273 (39.1) None 1 yr.
2002 21.158 (20) 7/ 39.758 (38.6) None 1 yr.
2003-05 16.105 (15) 7/ 36.105 (35) None 1 yr.
2006-08 15.7 (15) 9/ 35.7 (35) None 1 yr.
2009-10 18.7 (18) 9/ 35.7 (35) None  1 yr.
1/ Includes the effects of the exclusion, the alternative tax, the minimum tax, the alternative minimum tax, the maximum tax, the
phase-out of itemized deductions, and income tax surcharges.
2/ From 1922 to 1933, taxpayers could elect an alternative tax rate of 12.5 percent.
3/ From 1934 to 1941, the exclusion increased with the holding period.
4/ These rates include the effects of the tax on included gains, the minimum tax on excluded gains and the "spoiling"
of the maximum tax on earned income.  Without the interaction with the maximum tax, the maximum rates were
36.5 percent in 1972-75 and 39.875 percent in 1976-78.
5/ An alternative 20 percent rate applied to gains on assets sold after June 9, 1981.
6/ The statutory tax rate on capital gains is capped at 28 percent.  Effective tax rates can be higher due to various
phase-out provisions.  Rates for 1991-96 include the effects of the 3 percent phase-out of itemized deductions.
7/ The statutory tax rate on capital gains is capped at 28 percent.  Effective tax rates can be higher due to various
phase-out provisions.  Tax rates for 1997-2005 include the 3% phase-out of itemized deductions. 
8/ After May 6, 1997 but before July 29, 1997, gains on assets held over one year were taxed at 10 and 20 percent
rates.  From July 29 through December 31, 1997 the 10 and 20 rates only applied to gains on assets held over 18
months, and gains on assets held 12 to 18 months were taxed as under pre-1997 law.
9/ Beginning in 2006, gains on assets acquired on or after January 1, 2002 (or marked-to-market and capital gains tax
paid on the accrued gains) and held over 5 years are eligible for an 18% rate.  Rates for 2006-2007 include a 2%
phase-out of itemized deductions.
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Taxation of capital gains has long been a source of controversy between those in the financial
markets and the federal government.  Many in the financial world believe this tax has an adverse
effect on the market by limiting investment in growth industries whose gains to investors would be
taxed at the higher capital gains rate.  For many years, Congress has been petitioned to lower or
remove the capital gains tax to give investors the incentive to invest in more small capitalization,
growth companies.  However, some government leaders have long seen the capital gains tax as a
convenient source of funding for government expenditures.  Estimates from the Congressional
Budget Office place the amount of revenue generated by capital gains taxes at $35 to $50 billion
annually.  These legislators also believe the tax is borne by a small constituency of wealthy investors
who can most afford to pay.  This is only partly true.  Individuals in the $200,000 and up category
account for the major portion of the dollar tax savings from the reduction in capital gains.  The
Congressional Budget Office found that the top 5% of households, with regard to income, realized
76% of the total dollar gains from capital gains (Rubin, 1997).  However, a study by the nonprofit
Tax Foundation (1995) finds that 38% of tax returns filed which included capital gains reported from
1942 to 1992 have been filed by taxpayers with less than $100,000 in annual income (measured in
constant dollars).  By 1995, the figures show that the percentage of total filings by this segment had
risen to 82%.  Economic analysis shows that lower income investors will benefit proportionally
more than high income investors.  More and more, the capital gains tax is a matter for middle class
America since 40% of the population currently own stock in some form or fashion and this
percentage is rapidly increasing with the introduction of discount brokerages and online trading.
Thirty percent of capital gains are realized by the fastest growing segment of the population, senior
citizens.  This class of citizen currently makes up nearly 13% of the population.  Others in
government believe a reduction in the capital gains tax will promote investment and stimulate
growth in the economy.  They feel that an increased incentive to invest in small, growth companies
can only lead to economic expansion and prosperity.  There has been, however, some contradictory
evidence concerning the benefit of the tax cut.  Eichner & Sinai (2002) attempt to measure capital
gains elasticity to tax rate changes.  They estimate a long-run elasticity of -0.74 and estimate that
-0.97 would be revenue neutral.  This is based on the idea that investors would have eventually
realized the gains at the higher tax rate in the future if the rate had not been reduced and the PV of
these lost revenues is higher than the increased revenues received in 1997 at the lower rate.  The
evidence to date suggests that a capital gains tax cut, may or may not, be effective for encouraging
new capital formation in startup companies.  Other tax options are seen as being equally conducive
to the formation of capital with fewer of the negative side effects (McGee, 1998).  The debate has
been sporadic and emotionally charged for many years and will continue to rage for years to come.
In the past two decades, the capital gains tax has undergone four different structural changes.
The period from early 1979 to mid 1981 saw a maximum capital gains tax rate of 28%.  Capital
gains were subject to a 60% deduction and then taxed at a rate no higher than the maximum
marginal tax rate of 70%, thus the top capital gains tax rate was 28%.   In 1981, the top income tax
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bracket was lowered to 50% by the Economic Recovery Tax Act, effectively lowering the capital
gains tax rate to 20%.  This rate persisted until the Tax Reform Act of 1986 reduced the tax rate on
ordinary income and repealed the capital gains deductions.  The maximum rate on ordinary income
was lowered to 28% and capital gains were then taxed at the ordinary income tax rate.  On August
5, 1997, the President signed the Taxpayer Relief Bill of 1997 into law.  The effect of the legislation
was to lower tax rates on several types of capital gains, from the sale of a home or securities to gifts
and inheritances.  The top capital gains tax rate for individual taxpayers is reduced from 28% to
20%.  Taxpayers in the 15% tax bracket would pay a net capital gains tax rate of 18% and only 8%
after the year 2000 for assets held more than five years. It is stipulated that all assets be held for a
minimum of 18 months unless sold after May 6, 1997 but before July 29, 1997.  If sold during this
interval, they must have been held for a minimum of 12 months.  Short-term gains on assets held less
than the 18-month minimum will still be taxed as ordinary income at the appropriate rate.  In 2003
President Bush’s tax law changes reduced the top tax rate on long-term capital gains from 20% to
15%.  The new rate applies to gains realized after May 5, 2003, but the rate will expire after Dec.
31, 2008.  Lower income earners in the 10% and 15% tax brackets now pay 5% on their long-term
capital gains instead of the current 8% rate.
The 1997 Tax Relief and Budget Reconciliation Act was viewed at that time by some as an
attempt by the government to, once again, encourage risky investment by giving preferential tax
treatment to capital gains.  Many of the companies which rely on capital gains over dividends to
reward their investors are in the pharmaceutical and higher technology industries.  Encouraging
investment in these industries was seen, by the government, to have a significant impact on the
welfare of the nation and the continuance of the economic boom of the 1990's.  It would, therefore,
be in the best interest of the nation to encourage continued investment in these industries by granting
favorable tax consideration to their shareholders.  The decrease in capital gains would also allow
investors, who were trapped by capital gains tax, to avoid some of the impact of the inflation
adjusted capital gains tax rate.  Under the 28% maximum rate, an investor with a $100,000
unrealized capital gain in 1992 on a $100,000 investment made in 1980 would have an effective
capital gains tax rate of 94.6% after the adjustment for the effects of inflation.  Inflation would have
eroded 70.4% of the value of the gain and another 28% would be owed in taxes resulting in the
effective capital gains tax rate given above.  Under such a scenario, an investor is almost condemned
to hold a security with a large capital gain due to the abnormally high effective capital gains tax rate.
In the above instance, if the assets were sold for less than $197,778, the tax owed would be greater
than the inflation adjusted gain from the sale.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Event studies have long been used to test for the presence of abnormal returns on a particular
security occurring around a particular announcement (or event).  If abnormal returns do coincide
14
Academy of Accounting and Financial Studies Journal, Volume 11, Number 1, 2007
with announcement, then it is possible to conclude that the announcement contained some new
information that was not already reflected in the price of the security.  
If this is true, then the semi-strong form market efficiency hypothesis does not hold.  Fama
(1970) defined semi-strong-form market efficiency as investors’ inability to earn excess returns
using public information.  According to this hypothesis, when the announcement of passage of the
1997 Taxpayer Relief bill occurred on May 7, the market should, if there is new information
contained within the announcement, immediately incorporate that information into the price of
securities.  Additionally, it is reasonable to believe that there may be a small, possibly significant,
impact on stock prices on the day of the actual signing of the legislation into law on August 5.
President Clinton had stated that he intended to sign the bill and most people believed he was
sincere, but the actual signing removed all uncertainty.
Merton Miller & Franco Modigliani (1961) demonstrate that in the absence of taxation,
dividend policy has no effect on the valuation of shares by the market.  But in the real world, taxes
and tax policies do exist and do impact the way individuals value a share of stock.  Poterba &
Summers (1984) conduct a study on how the tax codes affect the valuation of dividends by investors.
They find that changes in the taxation of dividends have a substantial effect on the premiums
required by investors to induce them to receive returns in the form of dividends.  This study was
conducted when the top tax rate on capital gains had been lowered to 20% from its previous 28%.
They also conclude that taxes account for part of the positive relationship between yields and stock
market returns.  Bolster, Lindsey & Mitrusi (1989) conduct a study of the effect of the 1986 Tax
Reform Act on stock market trading.  They find that the tax induced effects are significant and that
holdings of long term winners fell in 1986 as individuals opted away from the capital gains stocks
which were suddenly being taxed as ordinary income.  
Does the fact that the announcement is preceded with a pledge to pass a capital gains tax
change remove some of the effect of the announcement?  Subramanyam (1996) concludes that the
average price response declines with the absolute magnitude of the surprise.  The amount of
information disclosed could change as the market anticipates the outcome of the Congressional fight
over the capital gains tax.  Subramanyam suggests that, in fact, the level of reaction will be subdued
as the level of surprise about the announcement diminishes.  Ball & Brown (1968), in a study on the
effects of earnings announcements on stock prices, concludes that only 10-15% of the information
contained in the announcement is not anticipated prior to the actual announcement.  Would the stock
market discount the information content of the passage of the Taxpayer Relief Act prior to the actual
passage of the bill?  Ball suggests that the presence of abnormal returns is often the result of some
deficiency in the asset pricing model used in the study, not from inefficiencies of the market.  If this
is the case, using the proper pricing model, there should be no observable abnormal returns present
at the announcement of the bill’s passage.
Anderson and Butler (1997) conduct an experimental market to test the impact of tax
incentives on the price of risky securities.  Students at an accredited university participate as buyers
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and sellers in a simulated market where differing levels of risk are associated with securities
depending on their tax status.  The students trade the securities during a series of trading sessions.
They are told the relative risk of the securities and allowed to buy or sell during each session.  The
study finds that tax-favored securities did, indeed, enjoy a higher price than that of securities that
did not receive preferential capital gains tax treatment.  The study uses a benchmark, described as
an equally risky, non-tax-favored asset, against which it weighs the impact of the tax incentive.  The
authors find that the risk premia were greater for stocks with ordinary tax treatment than for those
which enjoyed a tax-favored status.  Reese (1998) uses IPOs issued prior to TRA 1986 and finds
significant price reduction and increased volume for appreciated stocks during the week after
qualification.  This apparently indicates that investors are motivated to delay capital gain realization
until they are treated as long-term instead of short-term due to differential tax treatment.  In a
supporting theoretical piece, Shackelford & Verrecchia (2002) develop a model dealing with
Intertemporal Tax Discontinuity (IDT) defined as “a circumstance in which different tax rates are
applied to gains realized at one point in time versus some other point in time”.  Their model suggests
that IDTs amplify price changes at the time of disclosure.
In an attempt to explain the impact on future taxable capital gains resulting from a change
in capital gains taxes, Ricketts & White (1992) examine the capital gains tax changes that took place
in 1978, 1981 and 1986.  They predict that the highest pretax returns should result from the period
in which capital gains are highest and that the increases in capital gains taxes should increase a firms
cost of capital.  The authors test linear regression models for aggregate monthly returns from the
DJIA, S&P 500, and the NASDAQ indices.  Each of the indices is tested separately since they
hypothesize that the composition of the markets should reflect upon the impact of the changes.  The
OTC markets which are comprised of largely individual investors (Henderson, 1990) should see a
more substantial impact than the NYSE market which is more weighted toward large, institutional
investors.  The S&P, which is more mixed than the others, should lie between the two extremes.
Interest rates and an index of indicators are used as control variables to absorb the impact of the
changing economic environment over the period between the various tax rate changes.  The period
around the Crash of 1987 is removed to reduce the impact of the excessive large negative returns
associated with the crash.  The authors conclude that the pretax returns on stocks are, indeed, higher
during the periods of higher capital gains tax rates and fall when the maximum tax rate is reduced.
Lang & Shackleford (1999) document that stock prices moved inversely with dividend yields
during the week surrounding the announcement of an agreement on the 1997 budget accord.  The
authors find that the change in share prices are decreasing in dividend yields among firms paying
dividends.  Lower dividend payer’s share prices are less adversely affected by the reduction in the
capital gains tax rate than higher dividend payers.  Investors place more value relevance on the
expected capital gains tax rate when assessing firms with lower dividend yields.  Stocks that will
pay their shareholders in the form of capital appreciation become more valuable to the investor with
decreases in the capital gains tax rate.  Share prices should increase as investors purchase the stocks
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in hopes of taking advantage of the preferential tax treatment of the gains.  The authors also find no
evidence to support the contention that shareholders will sell off their shares of stocks with higher
capital gains in order to take full advantage of the lower tax rate on their investments.  The increase
in price due to the advantage of the tax reduction more than negated any sell off of appreciated
assets by investors.  The authors, however, limit their data to the 2000 largest U.S. firms and
therefore exclude the set of firms which would be expected to have experienced the largest capital
gains during the stock market boom of the mid nineties.
Liang, Matsunaga & Morse (2002)  using the same data set, but a different methodology, as
Lang & Shackleford (1999) find that the market reaction to the capital gains reduction is inversely
related to the expected holding period of the stock and that this effect is greater for non-dividend-
paying securities.  In addition, there is an insignificant negative overall market return for the 3-day
window around the announcement day and for the week of announcement and this effect is strongest
for non-dividend-paying stocks.  Blouin, Raedy &  Shackelford (2002) look at the 1998 long-term
capital gain holding period change from a minimum of 18 to 12 months.  Rather than use all listed
securities, this study only uses IPOs that had been listed at least 12 months, but not more than 18
months.  Parametric statistical tests are performed on appreciated stocks vs. non-appreciated stocks.
They find a -2.54% decline in the price of appreciated stocks compared to non-appreciated stocks
on the announcement day.  However, when four outliers are removed there is only a -1.3% decline.
DATA DESCRIPTION AND METHODOLOGY
The data used in this study consists of daily returns of stocks trading on the NYSE, AMEX
and NASDAQ that had paid regular dividends in each of the twelve quarters prior to announcement
of the passage of the tax reform bill and stocks on those same indices which paid no dividend in the
past twelve quarters prior to that date.  The period of interest is between 1995 and 1997 with the
events occurring at the interval around the announcement of the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997.  The
first event is the three-day window around May 2, 1997, which is the day President Clinton and the
GOP announced their budget.  On this date, the two parties made it clear that they intended to pass
some form of capital gains tax reduction.  The second event is the three-day window around May
7, the effective date of the capital gains tax reduction (also the day it was announced).  The amount
of the reduction was not announced on this date, but the media consensus was that the new rate
would be 20 percent.  If the market was sufficiently convinced of the imminent tax reduction on May
2, there should be no abnormal returns generated by the official announcement of the reduction.  The
third event is the three-day window around August 5, 1997, the day the President signed the
legislation into law.  
Once the individual companies in each category are identified, the returns are collected from
the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) tapes.  A screening of the sample is done to detect
firm specific announcements around the event windows that would have had a substantial impact
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on the value of the firm’s securities.  Those companies with anomalous market announcements
during the event windows are eliminated from the sample to avoid introducing bias into the
estimation.  A three-day event window is used to aid in capturing the true impact of the
announcement given possible information leakage.  Brown & Warner (1985) suggest narrowing the
window as much as possible to increase the power of statistical tests since a longer window tends
to diminish power.  A ten day window was originally tested for this research, but no abnormal
returns were found to be significant.  Therefore, due to the loss of power from larger windows, the
lack of significance of any individual abnormal return, and an effort to conserve space, the results
are not included. 
The estimation period for this study begins 271 trading days before the May 2 declaration
of an imminent tax cut and ends 21 days before the actual May 2 announcement.  The first event
window examined is around May 2, the second event window is around May 7, and the third is
around August 5.  The estimation period is from -271 to -22 and is used to determine the parameter
estimates.  Individual events occur between -1 and +1 for each date of interest.
A market model is used to estimate normal expected stock returns on the sample of
companies.  Returns of the individual securities are regressed against the returns of the market
during the same interval.  The common market model given by Fama, Fisher, Jensen and Roll (1969)
is: 
Rit = ai + bi Rmt + ,it   for t = 1, 2, ..., T
Where:
Rit   =   the return on stock i for period t
Rmt  =   the return on the market index for period t
ai      =   Intercept
bi    =   the slope coefficient
,it   =   the disturbance term
T    =   the number of periods in the estimation window (250)
The individual security return is given by the following formula:
Ri,t = (Pi,t - Pi,t-1)/ Pi,t-1 for the non-dividend paying companies, and
Ri,t = ((Pi,t + Di) - Pi,t-1)/ Pi,t-1 for the dividend paying companies
Where:
Ri,t  =  the return of the ith security at time t
Pi,t   =  the closing price of the ith security at time t
Pi,t-1 =  the closing price of the ith security at time t-1
Di   =  the dividends paid to the ith security during the estimation period
18
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The returns of the dividend paying companies are dividend-adjusted to capture the full
impact of their difference from companies that did not pay dividends.  Since a part of the return to
shareholders in the dividend paying category is the dividends received, these dividends must be
included to accurately reflect the security’s rate of return.  Companies that paid a dividend in the 21
days prior to the May 2 announcement or the 21 days after the August 5 announcement are not
included in the sample due to the dividend bias presented by the payment.  These returns are then
compared to a sample of returns from companies that did not pay dividends during the period in
question.    
Firms are chosen that had paid dividends in each of the previous twelve quarters to conform
to the requirement placed on non-dividend paying companies.  Companies that left the market during
the event time period are dropped from the sample.  The CRSP equally-weighted index will serve
as the market proxy.  The parameters ai and bi are calculated using the 250 trading day period before
the first announcement of an imminent agreement.  Each firm’s residuals (abnormal returns) during
the event periods are calculated by the following equation:
ARi,t = Ri,t - (ai + bi Rm,t)
Average abnormal return across companies for a given date t is:
Average ARt = sum(ARi,t/N)
Where:
N = number of companies in the sample
The cumulative abnormal returns during the event windows are calculated as:
CAR = sum(average ARt) For T = 3
Cumulative abnormal returns are computed for each of the intervals of interest.  The
hypothesis test is that the CARs are equal to zero.  If the cumulative abnormal returns are found to
be statistically not different from zero, then there is no impact from the events.  T-tests are
conducted on each of the time intervals to determine if the dividend paying companies differ from
the non-dividend paying companies in their average abnormal return and, if so, when the impact
occurred.
The t-statistics for the cumulative abnormal returns are calculated as:
CT = CAR / (FCAR/sqrt(N))
Where:
FCAR = the standard deviation of the 3-day excess returns, and
N      = the number of firms in the sample.
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RESULTS
The data is analyzed to meet the criteria given and the result is a sample of 7,359 stocks from
the CRSP data files.  Of this sample, 3182 were identified as dividend paying and 4177 were
identified as non-dividend paying.  
Table 1:  Deal Announcement Window
This table examines the three-day window around the date of the announcement that a budget deal has been
reached which contains a capital gains tax reduction.
Non-Dividend Paying Dividend Paying 
DAY AR T CAR CT AR T CAR CT
05/01/97 -1 -0.093 -1.177 -0.093 -1.177 -0.009 -0.561 -0.009 -0.561
05/02/97 0 -0.104 -1.315 -0.196 -1.762* -0.007 -0.409 -0.016 -0.686
05/05/97 +1 -0.108 -1.376 -0.305 -2.233* -0.011 -0.655 -0.026 -0.938
  * statistically significant at the .10 level
** statistically significant at the .01 level
Table 1 contains the results of examining a three-day window around the budget
announcement date of May 2.  The findings show that the non-dividend paying companies
experienced statistically significant abnormal returns on the day of the announcement of a budget
deal and the following trading day.  Dividend paying stocks experienced no statistically significant
abnormal returns on either of the days.  The magnitude of abnormal returns for the non-dividend
paying stocks is almost ten times that of the group of dividend paying companies.
Table 2:  Announcement of May 7 Effective Date
This table examines the three-day window around the date of the announcement that the effective date would be
May 7, 1997.
Non-Dividend Paying Dividend Paying 
DAY AR T CAR CT AR T CAR CT
05/06/97 -1 -0.092 -1.173 -0.092 -1.173 -0.010 -0.621 -0.010 -0.621
05/07/97 0 -0.061 -0.780 -0.154 -1.381 -0.010 -0.627 -0.020 -0.882
05/08/97 +1 -0.078 -0.988 -0.232 -1.698* -0.014 -0.832 -0.034 -1.201
 * statistically significant at the .10 level
** statistically significant at the .01 level
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Table 2 shows the results of examining a three-day window around the announcement of the
effective date of the capital gains reduction.  On May 7, an effective date for the tax cut was
announced by Senate Finance chairman William Roth and House Ways and Means Chairman
William Archer.  The effective date was May 7, 1997 but there was no specified capital gains tax
rate.  It was known that the rate would decline and speculation was that the rate would be between
15 and 20 percent.  The results show that there was a statistically significant cumulative abnormal
return present on the day following the announcement of the effective date.  The lower level of
significance may be indicative of the fact that the market participants may have anticipated that the
effective date would have been much earlier in the year.  If this was true, much of the market
adjustment would have already taken place.
Table 3:  Signing Date Window
This table examines the three-day window around the date that the legislation was signed by President Clinton.
Non-Dividend Paying Dividend Paying 
DAY AR T CAR CT AR T CAR CT
08/04/97 -1 -0.062 -0.787 -0.062 -0.787 -0.012 -0.738 -0.012 -0.738
08/05/97 0 -0.058 -0.742 -0.120 -1.082 -0.011 -0.681 -0.023 -1.003
08/06/97 +1 -0.064 -0.807 -0.184 -1.349 -0.009 -0.581 -0.033 -1.155
  * statistically significant at the .10 level
** statistically significant at the .01 level
Table 3 summarizes the results of examining a three-day window around the date the
legislation was actually signed by President Clinton.  If the market had already responded to the
news of the deal and the surprise factor had disappeared, we would expect to see little or no
significant information contained in the actual signing.  The results show that, indeed, there is no
evidence of abnormal returns for either of the two groups on the signing date.  This seems to indicate
that the market participants had anticipated the outcome and adjusted their holdings to conform with
their expectations.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
In the summer of 1997 the Congress and President lowered the capital gains tax rate on
equities held for at least 18 months (12 months if sold between May 7th and July 28th).  This change
in the tax structure provides an opportunity to test the relationship between dividend payment, taxes,
and the market value of equity.  This paper tests the reaction of the stock market to this change by
observing the daily returns of firms that have historically paid dividends to their owners and those
that have retained their earnings and rewarded their owners in the form of capital gains.
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There are three dates of interest to this study.  On May 2nd the Congress and President
announced their intent to lower the capital gains rate.  GOP leaders announced on May 7th that the
reduction would be effective on transactions from that date forward if approved by the President.
On August 5th all uncertainty was resolved when the President signed the Taxpayer Relief Bill of
1997 into law.
The results show a consistently negative reaction by the market on all three dates of interest.
No one-day abnormal return is statistically significant, but the three-day cumulative abnormal
returns are significant for the non-dividend paying stocks around the Deal Announcement day and
the tax change Effective date.  This would appear to indicate that rather than stimulate the purchase
of non-dividend paying stocks, the tax reduction prompted investors that had felt trapped by the high
tax liability to realize their gains.  If large numbers of these investors attempted to sell at the same
time, the supply increase would force the price down.  While few would argue against the market’s
overall long-term efficiency, there are very few observers of the market that will argue that short-
term supply and demand imbalances do not exist and that these imbalances can not result in unusual
short-term gains or losses.  It is also apparent that some investors jumped the gun and began to sell
their holdings around the Deal Announcement date.  This early liquidation was probably in
anticipation of the new rates being applied to the entire 1997 tax year rather than a mid-year
effective date.
The tax policy implications are clear.  There was a substantial amount of capital that was tied
up in firms that had experienced high appreciation during the previous years.  When the burden of
high taxes was removed, investors felt freed to move this capital to what they considered to be more
productive areas.  Even if the work of Eichner & Sinai (2002) is correct and the 1997 tax cut resulted
in a small net loss in government revenue, the resultant reallocation of capital by the market to other
more attractive firms should be a stimulus to the economy.  This reallocation effect is completely
overlooked by Eichner.  A reasonable argument can be made that any level of long-term capital
gains tax is a millstone around the neck of the economy.  If the markets are allowed to freely move
capital from less productive uses to more productive uses without the penalty of taxation, the
economy becomes more efficient, produces more jobs, and grows more quickly.
There are several areas yet to be explored.  One area is the relative volume of trades around
the various dates of dividend and non-dividend stocks.  The question of total volume, relative
volume, and number of trades is left to later research using actual gainers and losers during the years
leading up to the tax reduction.  A second is the reaction of high dividend yield vs. low dividend
yield stocks to the tax change.  Finally, after the negative market pressure of investors realizing their
gains has subsided, did the market revalue non-dividend paying stocks upwards relative to those that
pay high dividends? 
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